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Cloud computing offers various services which are analogous to traditional data centers. 
The on demand supply of resources make this model of utility computing as the platform 
for many web based services. However, security is always a major concern. This thesis 
proposes a new architecture called Self-service cloud computing with virtual shield (VS) 
to secure the entire cloud environment. When a malicious attack is predicated, the Virtual 
shield (VS) dynamically changes the configurations of the client virtual machines (VM) 
using a reinforcement learning mechanism to achieve the required security. The system 
may be dynamically modified in response to changes in system configuration, state, 
and/or workload. The reward values generated during the learning process determines the 
reconfiguration of the client. Simulation results show that the dynamic reconfiguration of 
virtual machines when anticipated to confront an attack, diminishes the likelihood of an 
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Cloud computing is a novel architecture in the field of information technology. Cloud computing 
offers various services which are analogous to traditional data centers. Software as a service 
(SAAS), Infrastructure as a service (IAAS), Application as a service (AAAS), Platform as a 
service (PAAS) promotes cloud computing to various organizations [7]. Cloud computing 
provides location independent services to the user. Resource allocation, data management, load 
balancing is under the control of cloud service providers. However, security is always a major 
concern in cyber cloud technology. The principles, methodologies, and tools for secure cloud 
computing are yet to be developed. Various cloud security systems such as advanced cloud 
systems (ASP) through secure virtualization [8], cloud protector through cloud trace back 
mechanism [10], hierarchical attribute encryption [11] have been proposed to enhance security in 
the cloud environment. However, these mechanisms degrade the performance of the system and 
counter only known attacks. 
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A novel architecture called self-service cloud computing [1] has been introduced to resolve the 
security faced by guest virtual machines. This system is not concerned about the security of the 
host operating system since most of the privileges exists within the guest Meta domain created. 
Moreover, there is no standard way of measuring the cloud system with respect to security. This 
paper introduces an extension to self-service cloud computing [1] to dynamically configure the 
privileges between the host operating system and guest virtual machines in SSC (Self Service 
Cloud Computing).This protects the host operating system from the guest virtual machines. 
 
1.2 SELF SERVICE CLOUD WITH VIRTUAL SHIELD 
Self-service cloud computing is a service oriented architecture which mitigated security and 
privacy issues related to client virtual machines. Inflexible control, which requires cloud 
providers to define security measurements like VMware introspection, migration and check 
pointing are handed over to the client’s Meta domain in SSC. The Hypervisor and hardware are 
assumed to be a TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE since they are provided by trusted 
organizations in this architecture. In self-service cloud computing the host operating system has 
no privileges to view the guests virtual CPU, memory or the configuration parameters of the Meta 
domain. The operating system acts to initiate the boot up process and hold the privileges to shut 
down the virtual machines. Though this architecture provides a MUTUALLY TRUSTED 
SERVICE DOMAINS (MTSDs) which is a regulatory compliance between cloud providers and 
users it is not sufficient to handle the misuse of the cloud infrastructure by the guest operating 
systems. 
 
This research focuses on shifting the privileges between the host operating system and guest 
virtual machines. A Virtual Shield (VS) is introduced to act according to the information 
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provided by the MTSDs. The Virtual shield is a virtual machine designed to dynamically 
configure the guest virtual machines with the help of a reinforcement learning algorithm. 
 
1.3 REINFORCEMENT LEARNING  
In the proposed architecture the virtual shield learns from the environment using reinforcement 
learning. This learning in turn facilitates the configuration of the host and guest virtual machines 
dynamically. The shifting of privileges reduces the probability of an attack in self-service cloud 
computing. 
 
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Guest operating systems misuse the cloud infrastructure for malicious activities. At the moment, 
there is no way to identify the attacks because most of the privileges exist within the Meta 
domain of the guest. This increases the chances of an attack and results in various attacks on the 
host virtual machine and hypervisor. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this work is to reduce the probability of an attack even before it actually happens 
in self-service cloud computing by introducing a virtual shield in the system. The virtual shield 
has the capability to learn from the environment and dynamically configure the host and guest 




1.6 OUTLINE  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides the review of literature, Chapter 
3 presents the proposed work, Chapter 4 covers simulations and Chapter 5 with the results. 











































                                                LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Cloud computing refers to computing over the internet where dynamically scaled shared 
resources (mostly virtual) are provided as a service by using virtualization platforms. The cloud 










Cloud computing utilizes a service oriented architecture to utilize the services of the cloud.	There 
are different types of virtualizations that are used in cloud computing such as Storage, Network 
and server virtualization [8] which yields a different set of security concerns for each type of 
virtualization technique used.	
 
2.1 SECURITY ISSUES IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
The client or user is unaware of which physical system the process is actually running on and 
where the data is stored. If a malicious user is from same Physical system, he can get the data 
from the physical system. This is because VM’s (Virtual Machines) map the data on storage 
provided logically but all the data resides physically on single storage. Data centers are located 
across the globe. A user should be able to define where his data and process should reside 
because each country has different security policies. 
Different data centers have different security policies and different VM’s run on different zones 
of security leading to loss of policies and increased security concerns. Because all these VM’s 
from different security zones communicate with each other on a Virtual Network, a weak link 
will pose a severe threat to the whole application [9]. 
Since the cloud uses virtualization, it needs to keep up to date with the latest patches for all the 
virtual machines which is very difficult to manage.  Security configuration management is a 
serious problem and administrators have to keep track of each VM and all the security policies 
related to data and localization. The Cloud uses different service models such as SaaS, Paas, 




Virtualization introduces many more problems into the cloud [8]. Using virtualization introduces 
many new OS types over which the applications are run. These new OS’s are a security concern. 
Different virtual OS’s have different security mechanisms. If one of the new OS is attacked, then 
the attacker will try to get access to the underlying physical host.  This means it will affect the 
security of all other virtual machines running on this physical host. 
The VM’s communicate with each other over the network which opens avenues for the guest to 
guest attack where one virtual machine tries to attack other virtual machines. Moreover, it is 
difficult to keep track of the VM’s. In this scenario two VM’s communicate with each other over 
a network. VM1 can get information regarding VM2 by sending queries while communicating. 
VM1 might be an intruder or a malicious user. Since it’s difficult to keep track of VM’s it is 
difficult to determine who the malicious user is and what information has been compromised.  
All the services (Saas, Paas, IaaS, Security as a Service, DaaS, NaaS) [7] are offered using web 
services or Web browsers. Hence VM security alone is not enough.  Using these web services 
users will get access to the VM’s on which these services run. we therefore need to secure the 
way users communicate with these VMs. Cloud provider need to trust when a user uses an 
application developed on the cloud. A different user in another VM from the cloud can 
communicate with the application running on the Cloud. Hence, we need to have trust between 













Figure 2.2 Trusts between Users 
The dynamic and elastic nature of cloud introduces new threats [7]. When new resources are 
added to the existing cloud they must be compatible with existing security policies before use. 
This introduces dynamic security assignment before use. 
The proposed work is related to self-service cloud computing [1]. The self-service cloud 
computing architecture is modified to enhance security and reduce the chances of attack on the 
system. To enhance the security of the cloud system, reinforcement learning methods can be 
used. Furthermore, the virtual shield can be configured with different security metrics to defend 
against various attacks on the host virtual machine. 
2.2 SELF SERVICE CLOUD COMPUTING 
Self-service cloud computing is a computing model that resolves two shortcomings in the 
traditional cloud architecture. Virtualization is the key to any cloud architecture [7]. Virtual 
machine monitors are used in many cloud architectures to administer and execute client virtual 
machines. These virtual machine monitors comprises of a Hypervisor, Hardware and a host 
virtual machine called dom0. The hypervisor and hardware are assumed to be a trusted computing 










privileges lies within dom0 there is a high risk of utilizing this administrative domain for 
malicious activities. 
The two major problems in traditional cloud computing are 
• Security and privacy of the client virtual machine 
The state of the client virtual machine can be inspected by dom0. It holds the privileges 
to inspect the contents of the client VMs and their configurations. The client virtual 
machines security and privacy can be compromised due to various attacks by the host 
virtual machine’s (Dom0). Misconfiguration and malicious system administrators can be 
the source of attacks. 
• Inflexible control over the client VMs 
Virtualization facilitates different services to the client. It has the potential to enable 
services like, migration, check pointing and VM introspection [1]. However, the 
deployment of these services in the present cloud architecture is under the control of 
cloud infrastructure providers. The client virtual machines have no control over the 
adoption of these services. Upon the request of the Client, the virtual machines are 
configured with these services. However, these services won’t fit for all the clients. A 
few client VMs may use encryption to securely transfer data packets, but the service that 
checks the malicious content using signatures may not be able to use the encryption 
mechanism. The client virtual machines may need different security mechanisms for 
different kinds of attacks. Thus the present cloud architecture has inflexible control over 




Figure 2.3 Self Service Cloud Computing 
 
 Self-service cloud computing addresses these two shortcomings by assigning more privileges to 
client virtual machines. The protocol is designed to protect the client virtual machines from 
malicious system administrators and to provide control of the services required by the client. The 
SSC (Self-service cloud computing) divides the entire system into two TCBs (Trusted 
COMPUTING BASE). The system consists of the system level TCB, with the hardware, the SSC 
hypervisor, the domain builder and a client-level TCB, with the Udom0 and service domains. 
  
UDom0 is the client side per user administrative domain that can monitor and control the set of 
VMs of a particular client. This virtual machine attempts to start a VM in SSC. It also has the 
privileges to perform system services on the client virtual machines. 
UDomUs are the actual client side virtual machines with the guest operating systems. 
SDs (Service Domains) can be configured with required security services in the system. 
MTSDs (Mutually trusted service domains) act as a regulatory compliance between cloud 
providers and clients. This holds the policies and mechanisms that the provider will use to control 
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the clients VMs. The information provided by the MTSDs is the key source for the virtual shield 
in our prototype model. 
All these comprise to form the client side Meta domain. 
DomB (Domain Builder) is a virtual machine provided by the cloud provider to build the guest 
virtual machines upon the request from client. 
SDom0 (System side administrative domain) administers the client virtual machines. It takes care 
of starting and stopping of the client VMs. 
 
2.3 ATTACKS IN THE CLOUD 
2.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE (DOS) ATTACK 
A Denial of Service attack [16] is an attempt to obtain excessive computation resources from the 
cloud and make them unavailable to its intended users.	 When the cloud computing operating 
system recognizes the high workload on specific servers, it will provide more computational 
resources to virtual machines and service instances to adapt to the extra workload; this can be due 
to a Denial of Service attack causing performance degradation of the system. The Self-service 
cloud can be vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack, which can be damaging and might result in 
complete shut down or degradation of a client virtual machine. 
A malicious client might try to compromise the availability and integrity of cloud computational 
resources. A Denial of Service is usually caused by cloud resource usage exceeding the threshold 
value or exceeding the threshold rate of change (the threshold rate of change is an estimate of 
uptrend and downtrend during peak or non-peak periods).	 A	 Denial of service attack can be 
harmful in a cloud environment as one virtual machine can be used as a source of denial of 
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service attack to another virtual machine in the same infrastructure, causing maximum workload 
to the co-resident virtual machines [17]. 
Denial of Service attacks misuse the network bandwidth capacity and deteriorate the quality of 
service by creating congestions at the network level. But with improvements in network 
bandwidth capacity, the focus of Denial of Service attack have moved from network level to 
application level. Denial of Service attack uses legitimate application-layer requests to 
overwhelm server resources causing application Denial of Service attack. 
	Network based defense models have attempted to identify these attacks by controlling traffic 
volume or separating traffic patterns at the intermediate routers. But, these defense models protect 
at the network level, which the application Denial of Service attack can bypass. It also suffers 
from a high false-positive error rate because sometimes the unseen normal behavior are often 
predicted to be an attack. Since every traffic is reviewed against the normal behavior model, this 
expands time complexity and introduces extra service delays for non-malicious clients. 
Furthermore, in a dynamic environment incorrect prediction of an attack can reduce efficiency of 
the overall system. 
Testing Virtual servers for Denial of Service attack:  
The application Denial of Service attack always aims at disrupting application service rather than 
depleting network resources. 
• A Denial of Service attack saturates the server buffer with a flood of malicious requests. 
Malicious requests will negatively affect the victim server machines; consequently, their 
average response time (ART) will be higher than that of normal cases. Therefore, ART 
can work as an indicator of an application Denial of Service attack. Therefore, we 
calculate the estimated response time (ERT) of the virtual server by inspecting the 
resource usage. ERT is monitored to detect initial malicious activities during testing.  
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2.3.2 SIDE CHANNEL ATTACK 
The client operates on a virtualized cloud environment sharing its hardware with one or more 
virtual machines, co-resident on the same physical server. On the basis of a service level 
agreement with the cloud provider, the client presumes that their virtual machines have exclusive 
rights over the physical server. Although clients have special administrative powers and 
privileges to maintain their own virtual machines, they have no control or visibility on how the 
hypervisor does its functions (the hypervisor, also called a virtual machine manager, is a program 
that allows multiple virtual machine to share a single physical hardware of the cloud provider). 
The hypervisor controls the cloud provider’s processor and resources, allocating what is needed 
to each virtual machine while making sure that they cannot disrupt each other [19]. Clients know 
only about resources that have been allocated to them.  
A malicious client virtual machine may try to exploit its co-residency to extract sensitive data 
from co-resident virtual machines without their knowing. Victims are clients running confidential 
services in the cloud. We assume that, like any client, a malicious user can run and control many 
instances in the cloud, simply by requesting cloud resource instances from the cloud provider. 
Further, it is possible that an attacker’s instances might run on the same physical server as target 
victims. The attacker utilizes the shared physical server to exploit the victim’s confidential 
information. 
Testing Virtual servers for Side channel attack:  
We assume that the attacker (malicious client) predicts the availability zone and instance type of 
the potential target victims.  
Availability zone:	 The cloud is hosted in multiple locations worldwide, which are composed of 
regions and Availability Zones. Each region is a separate geographic area and has multiple, 
isolated locations known as Availability Zones.	Each Availability Zones in a region are connected 
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through low-latency links.	 When we launch an instance, we can select a region that puts our 
instances closer to specific target customers. (EC2 for example is divided into 3 availability zones 
i.e. zone1, zone2, and zone3) 
Instance type:	The cloud provides a wide selection of instance types optimized to fit different use 
cases. Instance types comprise varying combinations of CPU, memory, storage, and networking 
capacity and gives flexibility to choose the appropriate mix of resources for our applications. 
(EC2 for example is divided into 5 instance types i.e. m1.small, c1.medium, m1.large, m1.xlarge 
and c1.xlarge) 
An attacker (malicious client) can flood using probe instances in two ways. An attacker generates 
an attacker instance, which is like a target instance in terms of resource requirements and checks 
whether it is co-resident with the target. The two ways are: 
• Over some period of time, the attacker repeatedly runs probe instances in the target 
availability zone and of the target instance type.  
• We assume that an attacker can also launch probe instances soon after the launch of a 
target victim instance. The attacker then engages in instance flooding: running as many 
instances in parallel as possible in the target availability zone and of the target instance 
type. 
Each probe instance checks whether it is co-resident with the targets by comparing its instance 
UDom0 IP with target instance UDom0 IP.  
• A malicious client can determine its UDom0 IP from the first hop of its instance on any 
route. The malicious client uses its UDom0 IP to compare it with target UDom0 IP to 
confirm co-residency.    
• UDom0 IP of target instances is determined by performing a TCP SYN trace route and 
inspecting the last hop. (In TCP SYN, trace route malicious clients send IP packets with a 
short life, and wait for ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) packets to report the 
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death of these packets. An IP packet has a field called "TTL" (as "Time To Live") which 
is decremented at each hop; when it reaches 0, the packet dies, and the router on which 
this happens is supposed to send back a "Time Exceeded" ICMP message. That ICMP 
message contains the IP address of the said router, thus revealing it. TCP SYN trace route 
can generate more number of ICMP and UDP packets in the network [18]. 
Therefore, during testing, instance count of the clients can work as an initial indicator and then by 
monitoring bandwidth usage (number of ICMP and UDP packet generated) of the suspected 
clients we can detect the probability of the side channel attack.  
 
2.3 REINFORCEMENT LEARNING 
Reinforcement learning is learning what to do and how to map situations to actions to maximize 
the numerical reward. Reinforcement learning is defined not by characterizing learning methods, 
but by characterizing the learning problem [6]. 
 
2.3.1  ELEMENTS OF REINFORCEMENT LEARNING 
Policy, a reward function, a value function, and a model of the environment are the different 
elements of reinforcement learning. 
A policy defines the learning agent’s way of behaving at a given time. It’s a mapping from 
perceived states of the environment to actions to be taken when in those states. A reward function 
defines the goal in a reinforcement learning problem. It maps each perceived state (or state –
action pair) of that state. A reinforcement learning agent’s sole objective is to maximize the total 
reward it receives in the long run. A value function specifies what is good in the long run. The 
value of the state is the total amount of reward an agent can expect to accumulate over the future 
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starting from that state. Whereas rewards determine the immediate, intrinsic desirability of 
environmental states, values indicate the long-term desirability of states after taking into account, 
the states that are likely to follow and the rewards available in those states. For example, a state 
might might always yield a low immediate reward but still have a high value because it is 
regularly followed by other states that yield high rewards. A model predicts the resultant next 





































        PROPOSED WORK 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this work is to design an architecture, that reduces the probability of an attack in self-
service cloud computing. In addition to the components involved in SSC, the new architecture 
will have a virtual shield (VS) that exists between the host virtual machine and meta domain as 
shown in fig 3.1.The SSC protocol will be modified to facilitate the interaction between MTSDs 
and the virtual shield. 
 
3.2 SYSTEM BUILDING 
The basic assumption is that the applications and operating system are secure. Although the cloud 
service provider is trusted, the cloud administrator is not. This required for the provider to supply 
a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) running a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) and the physical 
hardware to be equipped with an IOMMU (Input Output Memory Management Unit) and a 
Trusted Platform Module(TPM) chip. Cloud system administrators are entrusted with system 
tasks and maintaining the cloud infrastructure. Hence, they have access to the administrative 
domain (dom0) which is a privileged Virtual Machine (VM) that is used to control and monitor 
client VMs. and the privileges that it entails. Cloud system administrators are adversarial (or 
could make mistakes), and by extension, that the administrative domain is untrusted. 
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Administrators have the means to misuse dom0’s privileges to snoop or even alter client data. 
This threat has been addressed in the SSC model. 
The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of the cloud infrastructure is split in two parts, a system 
level TCB, which consists of the hypervisor, domB, BIOS, the boot loader and virtual shield (VS) 
which is controlled by the cloud provider, and a client level TCB, which consists of the client’s 
Udom0, SDs, and MTSDs. Reconfiguration in this context includes the standard definition, that 
is, reconfiguring resources such as allocated processors, memory, disks, network adapters and the 
user interface. Reconfiguration in this work also means adding or easing restriction to the kinds of 
privileged instructions a virtual machine can execute. In this work, the VS will determine a 
course of action if a malicious VM is detected. The VS may recommend the VM be removed 
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SDom0 is the system side administrative domain. This domain controls the client virtual 
machines. The start and stop of the client virtual machines is done by SDom0. Though this 
component has the same functionalities as SDom0 in SSC, it has additional capabilities which 
don’t exist in SSC SDom0[1]. 
The SSC SDom0 has no privilege to view the state of the client virtual machines, i.e. the contents 
of virtual CPU, virtual memory etc. But in our proposed new architecture the SDom0 will be 
designed to have access if the client virtual machine is found to be malicious. The virtual shield 
provides these capabilities to SDom0 by providing the privileges to access the client virtual 
machines states. 
3.3.2. Mutually trusted Service Domain (MTSD) 
MTSDs (Mutually trusted service domains) execute privileged services that check regulatory 
compliance in a manner that is mutually agreed upon between the cloud provider and the client. 
3.3.3. Virtual Shield 
The virtual shield is designed with different functionalities and security measurements. MTSD 
designed in the SSC are the key source of information to the virtual shield, which provides the 
information about the type of attack and the severity of the attack. In SSC the MTSD act as the 
regulatory compliance between client virtual machines and cloud providers. In SSC once, the 
client virtual machines are identified to be misusing the cloud infrastructure for malicious 
activities the virtual machines are shut down and they lose its state. 
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In our architecture, the virtual machines are not shut down immediately. Once the MTSD identify 
the client virtual machine to be malicious, it triggers the virtual shield with the information. 
The information from the MTSD is used by the virtual shield for the reinforcement learning 
process designed to virtually configure the virtual machines to maximize security. The virtual 
shield holds a table with appropriate actions to be taken based on the state of the machine. Each 
state has a reward value. The actions are the virtual configurations between the host virtual 
machine and the client virtual machine. Virtual shield holds one table for each virtual machine. 
3.3.4. Domain Builder 
 DomB, the domain builder builds the client side Meta domain. Once the client sends the request 
to build the virtual machines, these parameters are send to the domain builder and virtual shield. 
Domain builder uses these parameters to build the client side Meta domain. The construction of 
Meta domain is similar to SSC, whereas the MTSDs are configured to trigger the virtual shield 
when the client misuses the cloud infrastructure. 
3.3.5. Client Meta Domain  
The Client Meta domain holds UDom0, UDomU, SDs and MTSD. All these components are 
assumed to have the same functionalities as in SSC, except the MTSD. The MTSD is modified to 








3.4 METHODOLOGY IN VIRTUAL SHIELD 
The MTSDs are configured to regularly update the Virtual Shield (VS) with status information 
about complying to the agreement between the cloud provider and the client. The VS keeps a log 
of usage patterns, generates metadata about data in the cloud repository that the client is accessing 
and generates a sensitivity report of the data. The decision tree in the VS re-assigns the access 
control rights based on a data sensitivity report, information from the MTSD, along with the 
output from the usage pattern analyzer, context similarity analyzes and internal states of the VM. 
The status information from the MTSD, along with the output from the usage pattern analyzer, 
internal states of the VM and access control rights output by a decision tree is input to a 
reinforcement learning process which will recommend a reconfiguration to maximize security if 
malicious activity is detected. The VS also holds a table with appropriate actions to be taken 
based on the state of the machine. Each state has a reward value. The actions are the virtual 
configurations between the host virtual machine and the client virtual machine. 
The proposed Virtual Shield will dynamically re-configure guest VMs when the big data cloud is 
under attack by a VM. 
The cloud is designed to dynamically re-configure the system when an attack takes place based 
on the observed states. This work defines re-configuration to be one of the following: (a) re-
configure resources such as allocated processors and memory to a VM; (b) re-define the set of 
privileged instructions a VM can execute; (c) both re-configure resources and re-define the set of 
privileged instructions a VM can execute; (d) shut down a VM. 
We use an ensemble approach for reconfigurations (a), (b), (c) or (d). An ensemble approach is 
used because the results of a set of reconfigurations when combined together yields a better 
security solution rather than just applying one approach. The input to the reconfiguration is 
compliance status from the MTSD, the internal states of the VMs. 
23	
	
3.4.1 Using Reinforcement Learning 
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is used for re-configuration (a), that is, re-configure allocated 
resources to a VM. RL provides a knowledge-free trial-and-error methodology in which a learner 
tries various actions in numerous system states and learns from the consequences of each action. 
A big advantage therefore is RL will learn even if there is no available training set. That is RL 
does not depend on supervised training with known attack types. RL can therefore learn new 
previously unseen attacks. However, RL suffers from poor scalability whose search space grows 
exponentially with the number of state variables. Moreover, due to the absence of domain 
knowledge, the initial security improvement achieved by RL may be poor. Instead of conducting 
RL search in the whole configurable state space, we first reduce the search space to a much 
smaller but “promising” state set. In our approach domain knowledge and security parameters are 
used to guide the reduction in the search space. This avoids performance degradation caused by 
random exploration. 
One of the reinforcement learning methodologies will be used for the learning process in the 
virtual shield [6]. 
A Wide range of applications can be framed as reinforcement learning problems. The application 
in the virtual shield is framed to one of reinforcement learning tasks and provided with the 
method to learn. 
The aim of the reinforcement learning problem is learning from interaction to achieve a goal. The 
decision maker is called the agent. The agent interacts with the environment, that is, everything 
that is outside the agent. This is a continuous process; the agent selects the actions and the 
environment responds to those actions and provides new situations to the agent. The environment 
also provides the numerical rewards, which the agent tries to maximize over time. A task is 
defined as a configuration change, which is one instance of the reinforcement learning problem. 
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          Figure 3.2 The agent-environment interaction in reinforcement learning 
At discrete time steps, t=0, 1, 2, 3 … the agent and the environment interact with each other. At 
each step t, the agent is provided with some representation of the environment’s state St ∈ S, 
where S is the set of possible states and St is one of the states of S. A (St) are the set of actions 
available in that state. After selecting the action A t ∈ A (St), the agent receives a numerical 
reward, rt+1 ∈ R and enters a new state. 
At each time step, a mapping from states to probabilities of selecting each passible action is 
implemented. This mapping is called the agent’s policy ∏t, where ∏t (S,A) is the probability that 
At = A if St = S where S is State and A is Action). In reinforcement learning the agent changes its 
policies as a result of experience. The agent’s goal is to maximize the total amount of reward it 
receives over time. In our system the mutually trusted service domain is framed as the 






3.4.1.1 Q-Learning as a model free based approach 
Q-Learning is a model free reinforcement technique. It can be used to find an optimal action-
selection policy for any given (finite) Markov decision process (MDP). It works by learning an 
action-value function that ultimately gives the expected utility of taking a given action in a given 
state and following the optimal policy thereafter. When an action-value function is learned, the 
optimal policy can be constructed by selecting the action with the highest value in each state. One 
of the advantages of Q-Learning is that it is able to compare the expected utility of the available 
actions without requiring a model of the environment. 
Algorithm: 
The model consists of an agent, states S and a set of actions per state A. By performing an action 
a∈A, the agent can move from state to state. Executing an action in a specific state provides the 
agent with a reward (a numerical score). The goal of the agent is to maximize its total reward. It 
does this by learning which action is optimal for each state. The action that is optimal for each 
state is the action stat has the highest long term reward. This reward is a weighted sum of the 
expectation values of the rewards of all future steps starting from the current state, where the 
weight for a step from a state ∆t steps into the future is calculated as γ∆t. Here, γ is a number 
between 0 and 1 (0≤ γ≤1) called the discount factor. 
The algorithm has a function that calculates the Quantity of a state-action combination 
Q: S X A → R 
Before the start of learning, Q returns an (arbitrary) fixed value. Each time the agent selects an 
action, and observes a reward and a new state that may depend on both the previous state and 
selected action, “Q” is updated. It assumes the old value and makes a correction based on 




Where Rt+1 is the reward observed after performing at in st, and where αt(s, a) (0<α≤1) is the 
learning rate.  
Learning Rate: 
The learning rate determines to what extent the newly acquired information will override the old 
information. A factor of 1 will make the agent not learn anything, while a factor of 1 would make 
the agent consider only the most recent information. A constant learning rate is used for 
implementation of the algorithm, such as αt (s, a) = 0.1 for all t. 
Discount Factor: 
The discount factor γ determines the importance of future rewards. A factor of 0 will make the 
agent by only considering current rewards, while a factor approaching 1 will make it strive for a 
long-term high reward. If the discount factor meets or exceeds 1, the action values may diverge.  
Initial Conditions (Q0) 









// s, s’ → states 
// a, a’ → actions 
// Q→ state-action value 
// γ, α → learning parameters (learning rate, discount factor) 
1. Initialize Q (s, a) arbitrarily 
2. Observe current state s 
3. repeat 
i. Take action a observe reward r, state s’ 
ii. Q(s,a) ß Q (s,a) + α[ r+ γ. maxa  .Q( s’,a’)-Q(s,a)] 
iii. S ß s’ 
4. Until termination 
Action Selection Strategies: 
In each state (except the terminal state), the agent must select an action. There are several ways in 
which to decide which action to take. The simplest form is greedy selection: the agent always 
selects the action that the highest state-action value. This method is pure exploitation. Boltzmann 








Boltzmann selection involves probability, but takes into account the relative values of the state-
action values. The probability that an action is selected depends on how it is compared to the 
other state-action values. If one value is much higher, it is most likely to be taken, but if there are 
two actions with high values, both are most equally likely. 
At a state s, an action a is selected with probability 
 
where T is called the temperature, and increases as the exploitation rate increases. High 
temperatures cause the actions to be all (nearly) equiprobable. Low temperatures cause a greater 















 4.1 IMPLEMENTATION 
CloudSim [14] is used to simulate the cloud environment. Cloudsim is a simulation environment 
to simulate the cloud architectures before actual deployment. Cloudsim provides java APIs to 
design the various elements of the cloud computing architecture. The underlying architecture 
contains different subsystems. Each subsystem is designed and simulated to satisfy the 
requirements of the whole architecture. 
Different subsystems in the architecture includes 
1. SSC SUB SYSTEM 
2. MTSD SUB SYSTEM 
3. VIRTUAL SHIELD SUB SYSTEM 
4. ATTACK SYSTEM 
5. CONFIGURATION SYSTEM 
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4.1.1 SSC SUB SYSTEM 
The SSC sub system is the main system which initializes the entire architecture. Upon request 
from the client, the administrative domain (Broker) in the SSC sub system requests the Data 
Center (Hypervisor) to allocate resources to the client. During the initialization, the other 
subsystems are also activated or initialized.  The current client configuration will be written to the 
virtual shield. The mutually trusted service domain is initialized with the different attack models 
and configuration parameters, which are in turn used to detect the malicious clients. 
 
4.1.2   MUTUALLY TRUSTED SERVICE DOMAIN (MTSD) 
During the client initialization, the mutually trusted service domain is also initialized with the 
different attack models to check the client’s attacks. 
The Mutually Trusted Service Domain periodically checks the network packets transmitted to 
identify the malicious clients. During this process if the MTSD identifies that the client is 
misusing the application, it notifies the virtual shield with the attack type. This information is 
being received in a configuration file, which contains all the system information and the attack 
specifications. 
4.1.3 VIRTUAL SHIELD 
The mutually trusted service domain triggers the virtual shield periodically with the activities of 
the client. If the MTSD identifies that the client is misusing the cloud infrastructure, depending 
upon the type of attack, severity of the attack and the existing configuration, it triggers the virtual 
shield and the virtual shield reads the configuration file and requests the administrator to change 
the configuration of the client for the predicted attack. 
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The Virtual shield uses the simple reinforcement learning mechanism to allocate the different 
configuration parameters to the client. 
 
4.1.4 CONFIGURATION SYSTEM 
Configuration defines the properties of the virtual machines such as computing capacity in terms 
of million instructions per second, image size, memory size, number of cpus, and bandwidth. The 
configuration system is a database which holds the different configuration parameters for 
different clients. It has the different configurations for different type of attacks. The virtual shield 
allocates these configurations to the clients by analyzing the existing configuration and type of 
attack the client performed. 
Different parameters in the configurations include: MIPS, IMAGE SIZE, MEMORY SIZE, 
CPUS, and BAND WIDTH.  
MIPS (Million instructions per second) define the number of instructions to be executed per 
second. 
Image size defines the size of the operating system image. 
Memory size defines the size of the internal memory. 
CPUs define the number of cpus required by the virtual machine. 






4.1.5 ATTACK SYSTEM 
The attack system is a database which holds different attacks metrics. These attack metrics are 
used by the Mutually Trusted Service Domain to identify the malicious client and notify the 
virtual shield with the type of attack and severity of the attack. There can be different metrics to 
identify the attack types. In our architecture for the purpose of simulation we used a 15 
alphanumeric coded value to identify the attack metrics. An example of 16-digit alphanumeric 
coded value would be as follows. 
 
00000000000001F  
00     -   Virtual machine id in hexadecimal  
00     -  Host machine id in hexadecimal 
00     -  Client id in hexadecimal 
00     -  Datacenter id in hexadecimal 
00     -  Resource event / reason for the attack in hexadecimal 
00     -  Type of the attack in hexadecimal 
01   -  Current state of the when the attack is predicted 
F       -  Usage parameter (Alphabetical A-J)  
 
Type of attack Encodings: 
00 - Denial of Service 







Resource event Encodings: 
00 – RAM 
01 – Bandwidth 
02 – Cpu Usage 
03 – Memory Size 
04 – MIPS 
State Encodings 
00 – Good 
01 – Warn 
02 – Critical 
03 – Resume 
04 – Alarm 
 
Usage Parameter Encoding 
A – 0%-10% 
B – 10%-20% 
C – 20%-30% 
D – 30%-40% 
E – 40%-50% 
F – 50%-60% 
G – 60%-70% 
H – 70%-80% 
 I –  80%-90% 




4.1.6 VIRTUAL MACHINE TERMINATION 
The mutually trusted service domain periodically checks the clients meta domain for attacks. 
These periodical updates are notified to the virtual shield to calculate the rewards for individual 
configurations. The individual rewards of the allocated configurations to the client are aggregated 
to identify the overall rewards of the client’s virtual machine. This aggregated reward is used to 
determine the threshold for the client termination. Once the virtual shield identifies the total score 
is less the threshold designed by the cloud provider or the administrator, the client’s virtual 
machine is terminated. 
The client is notified every time the configuration changes. If the client still tries to misuse the 
cloud infrastructure, the overall reward eventually decreases and finally results in the termination 
of the client’s virtual machine. The threshold is defined by the cloud provider for each and every 
client virtual machine. If the overall reward of the client virtual machine is less than the threshold, 
the virtual shield informs the administrator to terminate the client’s virtual machine. This process 
is explained below. 
    O (c)= ∑ A(c)  for I= 0 to N 
   if O(c) < T (c) terminate 
O(c) → Client Score 
A(c) → Reward of individual Configurations 
T(c) → Threshold 

















The communication protocol in the above figure4.1 explains how each subsystem in the 
architecture interacts with each other. After the initialization of Sdom0, the client requests the 
system side administrative domain for the virtual machine by passing the configuration 
parameters. 
The Dom0 requests the datacenter i.e. the Hypervisor to provide the requested resources to the 



















If the client tries to misuse the resources, MTSD triggers the virtual shield. Based on the type of 
the attack the usage parameters, and action would be taken using Q-Learning from Reinforcement 
Learning. 
4.3 SIMULATION ALGORITHM 
 
 
                                               Figure 4.2 State Diagram 
There are five different states on which the system has been designed. Initially the system is in 
state init, which represents the initialization of the variables and environment. The next flow of 
the states is shown in the figure 4.2. Good represents that the system is in a good state, when there 
is a probability of an attack it moves to the warn state. If the attack has been reconfigured and 
successfully defended, it moves back to the good state, through the resume state which changes 
the configurations accordingly. The system retains in the good state as long as there are no 
chances of attack on the system. If the attack has not been defended, it moves to the critical state 
and then to the alarm state sequentially. Each state has its own set of decision tree mapping; by 
which we could select on from the possible actions that could be taken in the system. The 
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reinforcement learning system determines what actions could be probably taken in each state by 
learning over a period of time. 
The Virtual Shield gets information from the MTSD, to determine if the event (observed 
behavior) matches a known attack pattern. If it is determined that the observed behavior is 
representative of a known attack pattern, respective actions are taken corresponding to the current 
state. If it does not match a known attack pattern, the information layer agent may determine the 
probability that the observed behavior represents a previously unknown attack pattern. 
Each action has its own reward value which is used to calculate the Q value which has the 
ordered pair of state and its action. For simulation purposes, the following are the reward values 
for each action taken. Since Shutting down a VM, is the ultimate possible way that a system can 
defend itself it is assigned the highest reward value. The virtual agent learns through experience; 
this is known as unsupervised learning. 
(a) re-configure resources such as allocated processors and memory to a VM -50. 
(b) Re-define the set of privileged instructions a VM can execute -100 
(c) Both (a) & (b) -150 
(d) Shut down a VM -200 
The algorithm goes as follows 
1. Set the gamma parameter (which is in between 0 & 1) and environment rewards in matrix 
R, which is the mapping reward values of state and actions. 
2. Initialize Q values to zero 
3. For each iteration (when there is a probability of an attack) 
a. Select the initial state, which can be obtained through previous data in which 
state the VM is, if there is no data present, assume the state to be in good state. 
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b. Do while the goal state hasn’t reached 
i. Select on among all possible actions for the current state 
ii. Using this possible action, consider going to the next state 
iii. Get maximum Q value for this next state based on all possible actions 
iv. Compute: Q (state, action) = R (state, action) + Gamma* Max [Q(next 
state, all action)] 
v. Set the next state as the current state 
End do 


















  RESULTS 
The purpose of the simulation using the CloudSim toolkit [14] is to validate the proposed 
detection model. We have made several assumptions to simplify the implementation of the 
simulation environment. The simulation results provide a reliable overview of the practical 
performance of the proposed detection model.  
 
The CloudSim toolkit is a simulation environment used to simulate cloud architectures.  
CloudSim provides java APIs to design the various elements of the cloud computing architecture. 
We show the efficiency of our detection model by varying the simulation environment settings as 
follows: 
5.1 Single Attack on a single Virtual Machine 
Each attack (Denial of Service and Side Channel) have been simulated separately, where the 
attackers tries to target a single Virtual machine. The figure 5.1(a) shows the Attack graph, where 
0 represents the attacks has happened, and 1 represents attack has been defended. We can observe 
that the system has been stable from 23rd run for the denial of service attack, and 15th run for the 
Side Channel Attack. The Stabilization implies that the Attack has been defended successfully 





Fig 5.1(a) Attack graph for a single virtual machine 
The following figure 5.1(b) shows the reward rates for each attacks simulated separately on a 
single virtual machine. The initial reward rate is assumed to be 300, it reduces when an improper 
decision or when an attack happened and increases when the system is successfully able to defend 
the attack. Each time the action to be taken is dependent on Boltzmann selection, which gives the 
probabilities for the action to be taken. The reward rates have been rounded off to the nearest 
integer to have a smooth graph.  
 























5.2 Combined Attack on a single Virtual Machine 
We have made the simulation combining both the attacks (Denial of Service and Side Channel 
Attacks) using the same initial reward rates. Fig 5.2(a) Attack graph and Fig 5.2(b) Shows the 
reward rate graph for 50 runs. The figure 5.3 shows that the attacks have been defended at 37th 
run, and hence there were no more drops in the graph making the system stable. The X-axis 
shows the number of runs ( Discrete time steps ) and the Y-axis shows for the attack graph shows 
0 if the system has been attacked or 1 if its been defended whereas the Y-axis on the rewards 
graph shows the reward values for each run. 
 
 




















Fig 5.2(b) Reward values graph for single virtual machine with combined attacks 
 
5.3 Combined Attack on Multiple Virtual Machines 
Combination of the attacks have been simulated where the attackers try to attack the system 
simultaneously on ten virtual machines. Fig 5.3(a) shows the attack graph for simultaneous 
attacks. Since the attacks happen on multiple virtual machines, the system comes to a stable point 
quicker than expected (comparing with single virtual machine) as in each run there would be ten 
attacks happening at the same time, which gives the system to learn more quickly. Virtual 
machine 6 has been subjected to continuous attacks, by which even after reconfiguring it several 
times, the configuration score has dropped over the threshold set by the administrator, which led 
to the shut down of the malicious client virtual machine. The graph going down below 0 indicates 
that the virtual machine has been shut down. Fig 5.3(b) shows the reward values for combined 
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Self-service cloud computing reduces the attack surface of the traditional cloud architecture by 
transferring most of the privileges to the clients Meta domain. However this architecture is not 
designed to protect the inter virtual machine attacks and clients vm attacks on the administrative 
domain and hypervisor. 
In the proposed architecture (SSC with Virtual Shield), the client side attacks have been mitigated 
by dynamically configuring the virtual machines based on the type and severity of the attacks 
performed by the clients. 
SSC with virtual shield is a new computing model designed to protect the host virtual machine 
from various attacks by the guest virtual machines. The proposed new design has the capability to 
shift the privileges between the system side administrative domain and client side administrative 
domain. This dynamic configuration of virtual machines reduces the attack surface and makes the 
cloud more secure. 
If the client tries to misuse the cloud infrastructure, the configuration changes according to the 
information present in the configuration subsystem. The simulation and results section explains 
the configuration changes and virtual shield termination.  
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In the proposed architecture, the reinforcement learning algorithm has been used to make the 
virtual shield learn from the environment. This algorithm holds good for a minimum number of 
client virtual machines, since a single virtual shield runs this algorithm to calculate the rewards. 
The overhead on the virtual shield increases to handle multiple clients and multiple virtual 
machines. Moreover, if the virtual shield fails, there is no way to protect the entire system from 
the attacks of the client. The virtual shield can fail because of hardware problem or may be due to 
the extra over head in handling multiple virtual machines. 
The proposed architecture can be enhanced by removing the single point of failure by having a 
backup virtual shield called a Stand-by Virtual Shield which performs backup tasks by 
snapshotting. Snapshotting is the process of identifying the virtual machines state and securely 
storing the states in external devices.  If the active Virtual Shield fails, the stand-by virtual shield 
can be made active. Multiple clients can be simultaneously handled by introducing the concept of 
multiple VM clusters in the virtual shield. Multiple virtual machines are associated with single 
virtual shield.  This works by replacing the reinforcement learning algorithm with map and 
reduce functions running on the cluster of VM’s. This removes the overhead on the system and 
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